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EWCs – a trade union “free zone”? 
Michael Whittall & Hermann Kotthoff  
 
1. Introduction  
The following text is based on a two year study of transnational solidarity within European 
Works Councils (EWCs). Funded by the Hans Boeckler Stiftung, the project focussed on 
factors which contribute to the development of mutual trust and co-operation between EWC 
actors.
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 Although the question of relations between EWC delegates and trade union 
organisations was not a central theme we were nevertheless interested in the nature of this 
relationship for a number of reasons. Like most studies of EWCs we were aware that trade 
union organisations not only fought a long battle on behalf of the EWC Directive (EWCD) 
but they often played a leading role in setting up EWCs. Furthermore, irrespective of the fact 
that ‘the Directive makes no mention of trade unions whatsoever, and regards workplace 
employee representatives as the agents of the employees’ side and as those who should be 
informed and consulted’ (Waddington, 2011: 28), certain “backdoors” to EWC meetings have 
been left open to trade union officials. Trade union officers have been successful in utilising 
the clause in the EWCD which allows delegates to consult an external expert of their choice – 
usually a trade union officer. In addition, a trade union presence within the EWC, often by 
default it should be noted, has been facilitated by the fact that many EWC delegates are trade 
union members and in some cases directly delegated by their trade union to attend EWC 
meetings. 
 
Seen from this perspective one might be forgiven for assuming that the EWC is not only a 
trade union construct but one which continues to be strongly influenced by trade unions. 
Certainly, a number of EWC studies (Lecher et al, 2001; Whittall, 2000, 2009, Telljohann, 
2005) suggest we are now a long way from trade union “free zone” of the 1990s discussed in 
the work of Lecher et al (1998). On the contrary, as we shall below there exists a train of 
thought which argues that the EWC’s autonomy, i.e. that it represents the interests of 
employees and not management, can only be guaranteed by such trade union involvement.  
 
                                                 
1
 Factors perceived to support the development of “common interests” include, centralisation of production and 
management structures (discussed in the text under the heading of as micro-corporatism/Euro-company) and the 
level of co-operation and competition between the different sites, the latter making such co-operation more 
complicated although not always impossible.  
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However, drawing on the findings of five case studies the article demonstrates that 
irrespective of such interfaces, the so-called “backdoors”, many EWC delegates noted that 
trade unions were conspicuous by their absence. Even in cases where they had been allocated 
a seat on the EWC, they either did not attend such meetings or when they did attend their 
presence was symbolic rather than substantial. In fact, contrary to many unions’ EWC policy 
positions, positions that insist on close co-operation between themselves and EWCs, they 
often merely play a game of “shadowing” EWCs, keeping an eye on developments without 
actually being involved. Left in the main to their own devices EWC delegates, in particular a 
group of individuals we refer to as the European vanguard, namely active steering committee 
members, appear able to function without active trade union support. That is not to say that 
members of the European vanguard are opposed to a greater trade union presence, or for that 
matter that they wish to usurp trade unions, i.e. that the EWC should become an alternative to 
trade union representation. In fact, respondents indicated how they would welcome a reverse 
of the current state-of-play, arguing as we shall see that unions have an important role to play 
in developing this still relatively new European institution.      
 
The following represents a modest attempt to understand current relations between EWCs and 
trade unions. As will become apparent the relationship is complex to say the least. The article 
is structured as follows. First we offer a concise overview of the case studies and individuals 
interviewed. We then address some of the main debates surrounding relations between EWCs 
and trade unions, such as the issue of “capture” and “isolation”. This concerns a belief that 
EWCs fall under the control of management when a strong trade union presence fails to 
materialise. We also consider the question of EWC collective bargaining – a variable which as 
we shall can have a bearing on EWC and trade union relations. This is followed by a 
consideration of trade union involvement in the five EWC case studies. Finally, we offer an 
analysis of this involvement or lack of it.  
  
2. Data and Methodological Issues  
The text is based on five case studies considered by many EWC experts to represent best 
practice – that is to say EWC delegates have demonstrated an ability to jointly address, and at 
times influence managerial decisions at a transnational level. The choice of the five case 
studies occurred after intensive discussions with an array of EWC experts ranging from 
researchers in this field through to EWC consultants and European trade officers. This process 
was complimented by an extensive review of existing empirical work on EWC and our own 
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knowledge of EWCs built up after many years of studying this European institution. 
However, as our research demonstrates such a procedure is far from fail proof. In the cases of 
Sanofi-Aventis and Logistics Ltd our findings suggest the term “best practice” is not 
applicable.
2
   
 
The five companies include two US multinationals, Kraft Foods and Ford, Unilever a Dutch-
British concern, the French company Sanofi and finally Logistics Ltd based in Germany. Over 
a two year period we conducted between 10 mad 12 interviews with company level employee 
representatives in each of the five case studies, half of which were with individuals active in 
the various steering committees. These interviews also included non EWC employee 
representatives who played important roles within their respective national industrial relations 
systems (See table 1). We also interviewed national and European trade union officers either 
responsible for the five case studies in question or their unions’ EWC policies (See table 2).  
 
Table 1: Case studies   
Company  Interviews per country  
Kraft Foods France, Germany, UK, Czech 
Republic, Norway   
Ford UK, Germany, Spain, Belgium  
Unilever France, Germany, UK, Netherlands, 
Spain   
Sanofi-Aventis 
 
France, Germany, UK, Spain  
Logistics Ltd  France, Germany, UK, Netherlands, 
Portugal, Denmark 
 
Table 2: Trade union interviews    
Union  Nationality  
IG Metall  German 
IG Bergbau, Chemie, Energie German 
Gewerkschaft Nahrung-Genuss-Gaststätten German 
International Transport Federation  International  
Confédération générale du travail France 
UnitetheUnion  UK 
                                                 
2
 In the case of Logistics Ltd the company in question has requested that it remain anonymous. The reaming four 
case studies since the end of the research have agreed being named.     
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European Metalworkers Federation  European 
European Transport Federation  European 
Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft German 
Confédération française démocratique du 
travail 
France  




In the main the interviews took place either prior to or proceeding an EWC or steering 
committee meeting. Such a procedure had many advantages. Not only did it allow us to have 
access to a larger number of respondents from different Member States (See table 3 for a 
breakdown of EWC delegate structure), it also had the benefit that we were able to observe 
part of the meetings as well as use the translation facilities on hand for EWC members who 
neither spoke English or German. Unfortunately such a procedure was not fail proof; the 
researchers were unable to conduct interviews with delegates from Italy. In terms of local 
representatives this also involved us visiting sites in Germany, England and France.    
 
Table 3: EWC delegate structure  
Company  Number of Delegates  Steering Committee members  
Kraft Foods 37 delegates out of 19 countries  7 members from France (2), Germany (1), 
UK (1), Czech Republic (1), Norway (1), 
Belgium (1)  
Ford 19 delegates out of 6 countries 5 members from UK (1), Germany (1), 
Spain (1), Belgium (1), Rumania (1)   
Unilever 36 delegates out of 19 countries 8 members from France (1), Germany (1), 
UK (1), Netherlands (1), Spain (1), 
Poland (1), Belgium(1), Italy (1)  
Sanofi-Aventis 
 
37 delegates out of 16 countries 9 members from France (4), Germany (2), 
UK (1), Spain (1), Italy (1)   
Logistics Ltd  54 delegates out of 29 countries 6 members from France (1), Germany (1), 
UK (1), Netherlands (1), Portugal (1), 
Denmark (1) 
 
3. A complicated but necessary arrangement?  
 
To different degrees EWC literature has deemed it necessary to consider relations between 
EWCs and trade unions. Although it should be noted that with the exception of Waddington 
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(2011) questions relating to this relationship often appear as one of many issues being 
addressed by EWC studies. Nevertheless, there exists a general assertion that the nature of 
this relationship can have a bearing on the ability of an EWC to develop co-operation between 
EWC delegates. Trade unions are perceived as the potential glue that holds EWCs altogether, 
providing 1) best practice and expertise (Lecher et al, 1998), 2) a network through which 
employee representatives can communicate and 3) a normative basis which allows EWC 
delegates to speak a common language (Miller, 1999; Whittall, 2000, 2003). Generally, the 
literature throws up a number of issues that address the nature and importance of this 
interaction and its impact on the dialogue that takes place between these industrial relations 
actors. These include the following, management domination, ideological and political 
differences between employee representatives and trade unions’ fear of micro-corporatism.     
 
Concerning management domination, this involves what a number of authors refer to as EWC 
“capture and isolation” by management (Lucio/Weston, 2000; Hancké (this is fine), 2000; 
Royle, 1999. Hanké (2000: 55), for example, notes ‘as a result of this relative lack of interest 
by unions, indeed this ongoing and accelerating Europeanisation of industrial relations in the 
car industry is increasingly taking place on management’s terms, with the EWCs as a critical 
part of that process.’  Royle (1999: 344) came to a similar conclusion when studying the 
McDonalds EWC, ‘McDonald’s has been able to take advantage of loopholes in national and 
European labour legislation (and in some cases utilize dubious election processes) to 
minimize trade union presence in the EWC. [Furthermore] international trade union 
organizations have been kept out of the process…’ In short, the authors perceive trade unions 
function as a guarantor against EWCs becoming a managerial tool for country benchmarking, 
a threat posed by EWCs which has been addressed in a number of EWC studies (Wills, 2000; 
Hanké, 2000; Tuckmann and Whittall, 2002). In such cases EWC delegates have very little 
say over the yearly EWC agenda, they have very little chance to interact; in fact they 
demonstrate at best a sense of apathy towards working together and at worst they view each 
other in hostile terms. If nothing more EWCs are an important source for gaining access to top 
management, a means of lobbying on behalf national interests. Seen from this perspective 
EWC delegates appear content to play managements’ “beauty contest” game. The argument 
put forward here concerns the fact that the development of an “autonomous” European 
employee representative structure, one in which EWC delegates jointly help set the agenda, 
meet independent of management and communicate on regular basis with each other is more 
likely occur when a strong and active trade union “presence” exists.  
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However, there also exists a strain of literature which suggests the need to treat such over-
optimistic positions concerning the positive influence of trade unions in EWCs with some 
caution. Telljohann (2005) and Lecher et al (1998) remind us that EWC trade union 
relationship is extremely complex, problematical even. On the contrary, a number of variables 
can prove restrictive rather than progressive, this leading to friction between EWC members 
which in turn can be taken advantage of by management.  For example, the nature of trade 
unionism within this European sphere appears to represent a potential source of conflict 
between EWC delegates. The key point to recognise here is that trade unionism, often a catch 
all phrase, incorporates ideological, political and structural differences, which as Pulignano 
(2005) and Whittall (2000, 2010) note; are often played out within EWCs. This involves a 
situation in which unions compete to impose their (ideological) interpretation of the world 
(Whittall, 2010; Waddington, 2011) - a fact that not only can have consequences for the role-
played by trade unions but potentially the way this European institution functions. According 
to Whittall (2000) inter-union differences often arise when the question of seat allocation is at 
stake. A stumbling block he suggests that can lead disharmony amongst EWC delegates. 
Discussing the BMW EWC Whittall (2000, 2010) notes, that German works council 
representatives were fervently opposed not only to the notion of a British trade union officer 
should being allocated a seat on the EWC but that this individual should lead the British 
delegation as is tradition within British industrial relations. They were also perturbed at the 
thought that the allocation of such a seat would by default make the officer in question vice-
chair of the EWC. This ran counter to the tradition of the German dual model in which works 
council members are the main protagonists within the realm of company level representation. 
Needless to say British delegates were wary of the dual system, interpreting such a model as 
bordering on trade union de-recognition. Anderson and Thönqvist (2007) also note, that 
because of these cultural differences, although the issue of language restrictions should not be 
ignored here, the emergence of what they call “regional clusters” can occur. The most 
apparent being the North-South divide in which the former prefers social dialogue to that of 
industrial action practiced in many Mediterranean countries. In sum, there is an assumption 
that these cultural idiosyncrasies may paralyse the EWC as delegates become sidetracked by 
internal battles over important organisational issues such as the role of trade unions within 
this European institution.  
  
Finally, another aspect of the literature, one considered to have a great bearing on EWC and 
trade union relations, concerns what is commonly referred to either in terms of “micro-
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corporatism” or “encroachment”. In short, this concerns company level collective bargaining 
– which as we shall see represents a nightmare scenario for trade unions functioning within an 
industry level collective bargaining environment. The emergence of a European system of 
industrial relations, which in the case of EWCs legally excludes trade unions from this realm, 
implies that there exists a conflict over the issue of representation. Waddington (2011) has 
eloquently pointed out that the EWC is a “contested institution” in which the “strategic 
orientation” of EWCs (Lecher et al, 1998), i.e. what their remit should be, is at stake. In short, 
EWCs are perceived as a potential threat to the authority of trade unions’ negotiation rights. 
Undoubtedly, trade unions lobbied hard on behalf of the EWCD and have often played an 
influential role in founding EWCs.  Lurking in the shadows of these developments, though, is 
a fear, one that generally unites trade unions irrespective of their national heritage, that the 
EWC could “encroach on the domain” collective bargaining undertaken by trade unions 
(EMF, 2000a). This implication here is that the EWC and trade union relationship is 
potentially combustive. Certainly, a review of trade union policy documents, particularly 
those of the European Industrial Federations such as the European Metalworkers Federation 
(EMF) (2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2006), demonstrate that an important aspect of trade union 
involvement in EWCs concerns control, controlling the latter’s agenda in a way that clearly 
steers the EWC away from entering into negotiations with management or where this cannot 
be avoided at least ensuring unions co-sign any such agreements.  
 
This fear of micro-corporatism is far from unfounded. Marginson and Sisson (1996), 
Marginson (2000) and Kotthoff (2006) have discussed this issue in terms of what they call an 
emerging Euro-company. Such a development represents a centralisation of managerial 
decision-making practices in response to the emergence of an economic and regulatory space 
in the form of the European Union (EU) (Marginson, 2000). Because of the economic and 
political dynamics unleashed by the EU ‘The primary axis for internal organisation is shifting 
away from the national subsidiary, which groups all businesses operations within a particular 
country, and towards the international business division, which groups operations within the 
same stream of business across different countries (Marginson and Sisson, 1996: 9)’. The 
Eurocompany‚ is perceived as an independent organisational and managerial entity in its own 
right’ (Kotthoff, 2006, 43). As a consequence this can create a greater feeling of independence 
between employees and their representatives across Europe. This continual process of 
centralized restructuring leads to a feeling of mutual suffering and creates a concrete sense of 
dismay. Such a development throws-up a number of developmental paths for industrial 
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relations generally, paths that have consequences for trade unions, certainly for those unions 
having to function within a system industrial level collective bargaining. One involves what 
has commonly become known as “arms-length bargaining” in which EWC delegates attempt 
to coordinate positions across counties. This option keeps trade unions strongly at the head of 
the collective bargaining process, EWCs merely supporting this task by co-ordinating the 
negotiations in the different countries where the company is present. However, as the 
literature demonstrates, trade unions are fearful that an alternative path could emerge too, one 
in which EWCs lead the way in the negotiation process. Such a scenario could involve face-
face negotiations at a European level in which trade unions due to the current EWCD are not 
legally allowed to sit at the negotiation table.   
 
To summarise it is an undisputed fact that trade unions either directly or indirectly have a 
presence within EWCs. After having played a decisive role in both lobbying on behalf of the 
EWCD and supporting, certainly in the so-called “pioneer phase”, the foundation of EWCs, 
EWCs continue to interact with trade unions. Of course, this raises a whole array of questions 
about the nature of this association some of which we have touched on above and which we 
will return to below. The most pressing questions can be whittled down to the following: 
What degree and form of involvement can be observed? How does this involvement influence 
the functioning of the EWC? More specifically does such involvement promote or hinder 
transnational solidarity? Does a lack of trade union involvement lead to either “capture” or 
“isolation” and ultimately place the EWC on path towards company collective bargaining? 
Before turning to look at these key issues more closely we offer a brief overview of the trade 
union presence in the five case studies.    
 
4. Case studies – trade union presence 
 
In all the case studies unions, in particular the German unions played a leading role in the 
foundation of the EWCs. They helped initiate contacts between countries and offer important 
advice in the Special Negotiation Body phase. However, as the following sections 
demonstrate, trade unions’ initial enthusiasm would appear to different degrees and at 
different times not always sustainable.  
 
4.1 Unilever   
Unilever respondents portray trade union involvement in the EWC as nothing more than 
peripheral. It was noted, that a Dutch union officer had been given responsibility to coordinate 
relations between EWC delegates by the Industrial Federations, European Mine, Chemical 
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and Energy Workers (EMCEF) and European Federation of Trade Unions in the Food, 
Agriculture and Tourism (EFFAT). The individual in question, though, ‘no longer comes and 
was totally’ un-interested in EWC affairs according to a delegate from Germany. It was 
suggested that the Federations involvement was hampered by a co-ordination problem 
between EMCEF and EFFAT. However, such a lack of involvement is not restricted to the 
European Federations. Lower down the representative structure, national unions demonstrated 
very little initiative in shadowing events and issues dealt with by the EWC, too. Discussing 
the situation in Spain an EWC member from that same country pointed out that they 
attempted to keep the national federations informed of European developments within 
Unilever, but lamented that no systematic method was in place to facilitate such an 
information flow. Moreover, this was not a mere problem of the Spanish delegate. Although 
in Germany, the Netherlands, the UK and France unions are well organised in the Unilever 
factories they showed very little interest in the European level. Generally, EWC delegates 
could draw on the different national and European trade unions for support when required, 
especially information, but any initiative had to come from European employee 
representatives themselves as the EWC remains an issue still not on the formers’ “radar”. In 
2007, for example, following an extraordinary meeting of the EWC a decision was taken to 
hold a demonstration in Rotterdam against the planned closure of 20 European sites. Although 
the unions supported this day of action EWC delegates noted that the initiative came from the 
EWC.  
        
4.2 Kraft Foods  
 
On the surface trade unions have a far greater presence within the Kraft Foods EWC than they 
in the Unilever EWC. More than anything else this is the result of the affinity that key actors 
within the EWC have with trade union principles - these individuals’ biographies heavily 
influenced by being involved in their respective trade union at a national level. Clearly, the 
trade union presence is a deceptive one, though. It is one that has come about by default rather 
than active design, dependent on an individual’s biography, i.e. a “spill over” effect between 
national and European responsibilities. For example, although the EWC advisor is a NGG 
union officer, respondents strangely played down his role as a union officer. An expert in 
European affairs, he is undoubtedly viewed as invaluable to the EWC chairperson, but he is 
not seen as an external union officer rather as an inspirational individual within the steering 
committee. Discussing the union officers role one respondent noted, “He (NGG officer) is 
always at the meetings, but he can not make up for the lack of general trade union influence in 
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the EWC. How can he do this?” Certainly, the relative strong trade union biographies have 
helped facilitate a bonding process between the chair from Norway, the vice-chair from 
France, an Austrian delegate and the external trade union expert from Germany. Furthermore, 
the north-south division that divides union relations outside of the steering committee does 
not prevail. In fact, the delegate from France has embraced the notion of co-operation 
promoted by EWC delegates from northern Europe.  What has emerged is a triangular 
relationship, one that could be observed within the Unilever EWC too, that has become the 
heart of the EWC and in which notions of co-operation and solidarity are ever present. It is 
the engagement of active EWC delegates rather than the involvement of trade union officials 
which has helped to generate a common European perspective. Such a situation leaves a bitter 
taste in the mouths of these trade union ambassadors – the EWC embassy would gladly 
welcome a more active trade union presence.  
 
4.3     Logistics Ltd  
 
Of all the five case studies Logistics Ltd proved to be the most complex in terms of relations 
between the EWC and trade unions. This complexity is directly linked to the company itself. 
A state owned company until 1995; it has become one of the world’s largest logistics 
providers in less than two decades. It remains, however, a hybrid structure, the result of a 
competition between interest groups affected by different pressures. On the one side there 
exists a German workforce strongly associated with an old State owned company, a work 
force used to high social standards and job security. On other side stands the global part of the 
company home to low skilled and poorly paid employees. In many respects Logistics Ltd 
consists of two companies, Logistics Ltd Germany and LOGISTICS LTD Global, a fact that 
greatly affects relations between the key actors and as a consequence makes this EWC quite 
different from our other four case studies.  
 
Although Verdi played a key role in setting up the EWC in 2003, a year after Logistics Ltd 
went global following the take over of a global logistics company; Verdi’s position within the 
EWC is extremely contentious. Firstly, Verdi, the potential power base within the EWC has 
seen no value in this European institution – if anything its fears the EWC might open the door 
to a depreciation of German employment standards. Instead it has continued to focus its 
energies on representing its core members in the German logistics sector through the German 
model of industrial relations. Secondly, it supported the transfer of jobs from Belgium to the 
new European hub in Germany. As a consequence of the German union’s stance, in particular 
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its absence at many EWC meetings, this has allowed delegates from Denmark, France, Spain 
and the UK with strong trade union connections, together with UNIEUROPA and the 
European Transport Federation (when they attend), to have a greater saying in the direction of 
the Logistics Ltd EWC. All in all a strange constellation prevails, one in which a traditional 
German company sees its EWC strongly influenced to a large extent by non-German 
employee representatives.  
 
Faced by an aggressive management stance the EWC has become a network for developing 
trade union opposition to managements’ global restructuring of Logistics Ltd as well as the 
company’s disrespect for trade union rights outside of Germany – but with very little success 
it should be noted until now. Therefore, in contrast to the other case studies social dialogue 
with management is (virtually non-existent) poor within the Logistics Ltd EWC – on the 
contrary relations are marked by conflict. Although non-German trade union activists play a 
decisive role in guiding the EWC, respondents generally agreed that there were certain 
limitations to what it could hope to achieve due to the persistent lack of real involvement on 
the part of Verdi, a union which continues to retain access and remarkable influence over top 




The Ford EWC is the one case study in which the various levels of trade union representation 
are most conspicuous. National trade unions from Germany, the UK, Spain and Belgium, 
countries in which Ford has key production sites, all send full-time union representatives to 
participate in EWC meetings, from whom the German rep is simultaneously the European 
Metal Workers Federation representative. Why the strong trade union involvement? More 
than anything this would appear to concern managements’ insistence that British trade 
unionists be represented at the European level, this represents a form of socialisation process. 
Still very conscious of the industrial strife that marred industrial relations at Fords’ UK sites 
in the 1970-80s, management views the EWC as a means of trying to school British trade 
unionist in the art of social dialogue. However, the strong trade union presence is portrayed 
overall as partly immaterial. In sum, the Ford EWC is marked by a strong trade union 





Formed in 2004 after acquiring another Chemical company, Sanofi-Aventis remains to all 
intents and purposes a global company with a very French character. As a consequence 
French unions have displayed, like in the case of Verdi at Logistics Ltd, a lack of interest in 
EWC affairs, preferring instead to utilise national structures at their disposal to gain access to 
management. A mixture of conflict between French unions and a general fear of the EWC, in 
particular that this European institution could usurp its collective bargaining role, has led 
French unions to work against rather than with the Sanofi-Aventis EWC. 
    
By withdrawing from the EWC sphere French unions have potentially opened the door to 
other unions to play a more important role inside the EWC. So far neither national nor 
European federations have taken advantage of this option. Although respondents noted, a 
meeting was held in Brussels in the foundation phase which allowed delegates the opportunity 
to discern which trade unions were represented as well as how the unions differ in structure 
and responsibility, this coming together of trade union interests was short lived. The German 
trade union, the Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau, Chemie, Energie (IG BCE), a body of 
significant influence within Sanofi-Aventis Germany, has abstained from attending EWC 
meetings. Like their French counterparts German employee representatives utilise national 
industrial relations structures, in particular the supervisory board, to gain access to 
management. This process has even been strengthened by managements’ willingness to offer 
German employee representatives direct access to top management in Paris.   
 
5. Trade union presence and management control: capture and isolation? 
 
In all five case studies the presence of the union federations differed greatly. This guaranteed 
either directly through a trade union officer attending an EWC meeting or indirectly by 
reporting back through national union structures. To sum up: involvement and influence of 
the union federations would appear in some cases non-existent in others limited. Lecher et al 
(1998) suggested in their first systematic study of EWCs, that trade unions played a peripheral 
role within this European institution. Kotthoff (2006, 144) also observed a potential trade 
union de-coupling from EWC, what he calls „stillschweigende Marginalsierung“ (tacit 
marginalization). Over a decade later the trade union landscape appears to be virtually 
unchanged. EWCs continue to sit uneasily within the trade union portfolio. Interviews with 
union officers from various countries indicated that Europe is quite low in trade unions 
“pecking order”, collective bargaining and representing the interests of national members 
remains their cardinal concern. 
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On the whole, a number of factors demonstrate that trade union EWC involvement appears 
problematical –trade unions finding it difficult to define their role within this European 
institution.  For example, contrary to Pulignano’s (2005: 395) findings on the role of 
industrial federation officers there was no evidence, even in the case of Ford where the union 
presence was most pronounced and Logistics Ltd where union activists attempted to fill the 
void left by Verdi, to support the belief that such individuals assert their authority ‘to build 
bridges between workplace representatives of multinational companies and the development 
of trade union policies.’ Nor was their any evidence to imply that such union officers play a 
strategic role ‘in facilitating the exchange of information and practices among employees 
(Pulignano’s, 2005: 400).’ If anything, certainly in the cases of Unilever, Sanofi-Aventis and 
Kraft Foods union involvement declined after their initial involvement in helping set up the 
EWC.  
 
Even the much referenced training and expertise that trade unions were expected and reported 
to provide was not very much in evidence. In fact, a picture emerges, certainly in the 
Unilever, Ford and Kraft Foods cases whereby EWC members, especially those who meet on 
a regular basis within the steering committee, posses expertise which does not require them to 
seek trade union support. Close working relations with management, but more importantly the 
co-operation between EWC delegates, which as Whittall et al (2009) show is increasing 
helped by ICT, means that EWC delegates are well informed about company strategy and 
possible responses. Moreover, there was no evidence to support Hanké’s assertion (2000:104) 
that ‘it is difficult to imagine workers ever being able to respond to the contemporary 
economic challenges posed by the Europeanisation and globalisation of capital’ without the 
involvement of trade unions.’ Or for that matter as Telljohann (2005) suggests, that an 
inadequate level of involvement of fulltime union officers leads to de-motivation amongst 
EWC delegates. On the contrary, in spite of a lack of a trade union presence a core group of 
European activists, the European vanguard, are bringing this European institution to “life”. In 
most cases EWC delegates, specifically the steering committee members, are in weekly if not 
daily contact with each other, the EWC becoming an integral part of their employee 
representative artillery.               
 
In sum, trade unions failed to use their authority to encourage closer relations between 
countries or offer important training and expertise to any great extent in the five EWCs 
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studied. They played and continue to play a peripheral role. This brings us to a key question 
raised in the literature dealing with EWC and trade union relations (Royle, 1999; Wills, 
2000): are such EWCs threatened by what is commonly referred to as the problem of 
“capture” and “isolation”? Quite simply the evidence uncovered here suggests that EWCs 
retain their autonomy from management irrespective of unions’ inability to be more involved 
in EWC affairs. None of the case studies under observation demonstrated any degree of either 
“management capture” or “isolation”. A number of factors help contribute to the autonomy of 
EWCs even where the involvement of trade unions is not as developed as researchers suggest 
is required. Firstly, the delegates on the whole were not hand picked by management. The 
majority of delegates came with strong trade union credentials; credentials that by default 
appear to guard against management manipulation. Furthermore, a point taken up by Knudsen 
et al (2007) and Timming and Veersma (2007), namely that EWC delegates’ identity is 
defined by interaction with management, the “other” as they call it rather than by management 
manipulation. Here, management represents the “other side”, namely that this relationship is 
potentially, not always, underpinned by diverging interests. The EWC autonomy is also 
influenced by the way delegates set about organising their work, a procedure which helps 
individuals articulate their EWC identity. So much so that irrespective of trade unions’ failure 
to be more involved in EWCs, as in the cases certainly of Unilever and Kraft Foods, EWC 
delegates are nevertheless still able to represent employee interests and develop a sense of 
group solidarity. The following variables appear at play here. They include the need for a 
functioning steering committee that meets on a regular basis, and which is in continuous 
dialogue with top management. In addition such a committee has 1) to keep the wider EWC 
delegates informed of company developments as well as about any 2) discussions that have 
occurred with management. Furthermore, this has to be complemented by a willingness on the 
part of steering committee members to nurture contacts amongst themselves. In many cases 
such contacts are shown to lead to friendships and a strong sense of trust and reliability 
amongst the steering committee members. Naturally for this to work individuals need to 
possess good foreign language skills, usually English and the relevant committees depend on 
a high degree of stability. In addition, the lead actors within the EWC benefit from possessing 
professional experience as representatives gained from working within works councils at a 
national level. This last point is particularly prevalent amongst delegates from northern 
European countries, although a development could be observed whereby individuals from 
Anglo-Saxon and Mediterranean countries have come to appreciate more and more the value 
of social dialogue in recent years.            
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Finally, even in cases where management designate certain EWC delegates this is no 
guarantee that such individuals will abide by managerial demands. A number of factors need 
to be considered. EWC delegates we interviewed with a traditional trade union biography are 
aware of this problem and have subsequently taken relevant precautions to neutralise such a 
threat. For example, in the case of Logistics Ltd a number of delegates from southern Europe 
were asked by their local management to become EWC delegates, delegates who were not 
affiliated to a union. In response to this situation union members’ on the EWC developed 
what can only be described as an informal mentoring scheme, trade union delegates going out 
of their way to include non-trade union delegates in the decision making processes. This 
helped cultivate relationships and a mutual sense of responsibility. Furthermore, as Tuckman 
and Whittall (2010) and Snook and Whittall (2012) note, in the case of works councils set up 
by management such managerial nominees often feel obliged to exhibit a sense of autonomy 
after certain period of time. They feel obliged to demonstrate to the people they represent as 
well as other EWC members that they work with that are not management “lackeys”. Here the 
case of a leading Unilever EWC delegate is very informative. It concerns an individual with a 
clearly defined managerial biography; someone who went out his way when interviewed to 
point out how they had initially been very wary of trade union organisations. Over the years, 
however, their involvement within the EWC resulted in them not only becoming a member of 
a white-collar union but more importantly working very closely with shop stewards from 
more traditional organisations within their national environment.           
 
Undoubtedly, trade unions have traditionally been fearful that their lack of involvement in 
EWCs could lead to management hijacking the EWC and subsequently a situation whereby 
management uses this European institution to promote social dumping. Our research 
uncovered no real evidence to corroborate such a position. Even given the lack of a strong 
trade union presence within the EWC, delegates retained a strong notion of autonomy. A trade 
union officer from the IGBCE we interviewed even went as far as confirming this finding 
when noting that: 
 
The first generation has taken an important step so to say. They now have important 
organizational structures in place. Furthermore, they have also fought hard to be taken 
serious by management – and that is an important step.    
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Certainly, in the cases of Kraft Foods, Unilever, Ford and increasingly Logistics Ltd, 
management is increasingly being forced to recognise that the EWC is an important source of 
employee representation. Irrespective of a lack of or limited union involvement management 
has neither captured nor isolated the EWC. On the contrary, those EWC actors who are 
spending a considerable amount of time on European related issues, staying in constant touch 
with other members within the EWC network can be considered as representing a professional 
European vanguard within a developing European system of employee representation.       
 
6. What explains trade unions’ lack of involvement in EWCs?  
 
Ironically, it could be argued trade unions are not required to play a direct role in EWC affairs 
as this is guaranteed by a number of variables: but two in particular. As outlined above trade 
unions were heavily involved in the foundation process, something which allowed them to set 
the tone initially. Moreover, many EWC delegates are by default guardians of trade union 
values. Not only do the delegates from the countries with single a tier-structure often owe 
their current position to trade unions, but furthermore they play an active role in national trade 
union structures. As we shall see in the next section, though, neither of these facts, something 
underlined in the work of both Telljohann et al (2009) and Waddington (2011), are a 
safeguard against a potential de-coupling of the EWC from trade union representation. 
  
Let us return to the main question. Why do trade unions, even in cases where they have 
legally been guaranteed access to EWC meetings as in the case of Ford and Logistics Ltd, not 
play a more prominent role in EWC affairs? Is it as Telljohann (2005) suggests, simply down 
to the dominance of either a “single” or “dual” tier system of representation? An assertion that 
unions within a single tier industrial relations environment are more likely to be involved in 
EWCs as unions are the main protagonist in such an industrial relations system. According to 
Telljohann (2005: 37) this explains why Italian trade unions are very active in EWCs, so 
much so that he suggests ‘it seems possible to talk of a fully-fledged Italian model of the 
EWC that differs from the two kinds of EWC which are generally referred to in the 
literature… The Italian model is characterised by the leading role of the external trade unions 
that is typical of the one-tier system of interest representation.’ Hence, in turn this would 
appear to explain the reluctance of German trade unions to increase their EWC profile, 
German co-determination providing a clear division of labour between works councils and 
trade unions with company related issues the realm of the former. A member, of the Logistics 
Ltd EWC, for example, felt that this was one of the reasons, the other being a potential fear of 
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transnationalisation epitomised by the EWC, why Verdi had failed to play a leading role in 
the EWC that befitted its influence and size. Equally such an argument helps describe why the 
trade union officer leading the British delegation on the Ford EWC went out his way to 
emphasise the amount of time he invests in this European structure:  
 
I mean the easiest thing for me to do would say: “I’m sorry, I’m too busy, I 
mean I’ve got more pressing business”. I mean that’s the easiest thing in the 
world for a National Officer to say. But I’m doing the job that I’ve been 
employed to do. 
 
However, such a conceptual understanding we contend has certain limitations. Firstly, the 
dual system is underpinned by a mutual trust that has developed within particular national 
settings - the EWC certainly at this stage in its development cannot be compared with its 
national counterpart say in Germany. The division of labour that takes place here is based 1) 
on a certain degree of trust, this reflected in the fact that the majority of works council chairs 
in Germany are trade union members, and 2) that works councils are legally independent of 
trade unions. Moreover, unlike within the national environment unions have no influence over 
delegates emanating from other European countries. The EWC is unpredictable and difficult 
to guide from the outside. Next, in the case of the “single tier” argument the importance 
attached to attending every EWC and steering committee meeting by the British union officer 
responsible for Ford was the “exception rather than the rule”. The Ford situation reflected 
more than anything else the continued importance of the American car producer in the UK, 
certainly in terms of union membership for UNITETHEUNION, and management’s 
insistence that the British unions have a seat on the EWC (see Ford section above). In none of 
the other four case studies was such engagement to be observed. In the case of Unilever and 
Kraft Foods, for example, none of the unions in France, Spain or the UK saw the need to play 
an active role in the EWC. In sum, we found no evidence to support the argument that either 
the dual system or the single system respectively restricts or promotes EWC union 
involvement. Irrespective of prevailing national models unions’ involvement in EWCs 
remains limited with only Italy appearing to be the exception. What other factors then might 
explain unions’ inability or reluctance to be more involved a greater role in EWC affairs?       
    
Quite clearly irrespective of the policy commitment towards EWCs on the part of both 
national and European federations, the latter developing clear policy guidelines to encourage 
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greater trade union involvement in this European institution, such endeavours are likely to 
prove futile if the actors in question neither posses 1) the resources nor 2) what is best 
described as a European “normative constitution” (European outlook on the part of union 
officers’ at the national and regional levels) to fulfil this function. Our research would suggest 
that these two factors partly explain the absence of greater EWC involvement on the part of 
trade unions. Beginning with resources: both interviews with trade union officers at all levels 
of the representative spectrum plus literature on this subject (Waddington, 20011; Platzer, 
2010) confirm that unions’ Achilles heel does not only involve a lack of personnel but 
personnel with the necessary training required to serve EWCs (another reason why EWC 
delegates don’t utilise union contacts more?). Speaking on behalf of the chemical sector an 
officer from the IGBCE sums up the problems faced by trade unions generally:  
 
The problem now exists that in comparison to when we first started, then we 
only had a few EWCs and we only had to deal with the negotiation of EWC 
agreements, in the meantime we have lot. Attending to these EWCs in contrast 
to simply negotiating agreements is very time consuming. Quite simply to 
achieve the high standards we have set ourselves we need more people to 
coordinate EWCs.  
 
The respondent touches here on something that goes to the heart of European Industrial 
Federations’ (EIF) EWC endeavours, too, the cross-company coordination of EWC activities, 
i.e. ‘Develop common strategies. Speak with one voice. It is important because if you don’t 
speak with one voice then you cannot be successful (EMF officer)’. But as Waddington 
(2011) and Platzer (2010) note when discussing EIF budgets for the 2006, the EIF budgets set 
aside to undertake activities are limited to say the least. Waddington (2011:31), someone who 
has had unparalleled access to the EIF documents, tellingly states; ‘the income of the EMF 
from the affiliated unions was €4,326,873 and it employed 17 people. The corresponding 
figures for the EMCEF were €891,560 and 8 employees and for UNI-Europa €1,668,766 and 
16.5 employees… The situation amongst the national confederations, however, remains far 
superior. The Norwegian Landsorganisasjonen, for example, was €29,952,000 and it 
employed 270 people…’ Even though EIFs now have a network of EWC coordinators at their 
disposal, when questioned about the role of EIFs respondents indicated the Federations lacked 
the necessary means to either send officers to EWC meetings or ensure that nationally 
nominated coordinators, usually an officer from the largest union within the company, abided 
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by the guidelines outlined in the EIFs’ EWC policies. The following Sanofi-Aventis EWC 
member touches upon the current dilemma facing EIFs: 
 
We have the support of an EMCEF representative within the EWC. However, 
anyone who is familiar with EMCEF’s structure knows that there are hardly 
any financial resources or people to fulfil this task. One person is responsible 
for coordinating various EWCs, which occasionally have their meetings at the 
same time.  
 
The EMF (2000a) has even been forced to acknowledge that its coordinator policy is faced by 
a number of obstacles. These include:     
1) Different countries interpret the role of a coordinator in different ways. 
2) Some countries do not send their coordinators to EWC meetings 
3) Coordinators do not always have the necessary skills to fulfill this role 
4) In some countries the level of local autonomy restricts trade union involvement 
 
The question of resources brings us to our next point, the importance placed on European 
policy by national unions. Resource allocation is a highly political issue, depicting areas 
conceived as important by organisations. The lack of resources, for example, available to 
European officers at a national and European level, and all our respondents indicated this was 
a problem, is symptomatic we would argue of unions’ continued inability to make Europe a 
key agenda issue. The Verdi officer, for example, responsible for EWCs noted that a key part 
of their remit concerned servicing exiting national works councils. This involves, producing 
materials for works councils’ during election periods, organisational work prior to works 
council elections and analysing the results of the election. These all-time consuming 
responsibilities leave very little time to donate to EWC matters. Other union officers 
confirmed such a standpoint, too. In short, various case study respondents acknowledged 
suggest trade unions have struggled to Europeanize their structures:  
 
I have the feeling that the unions have been paralyzed in the last ten years, that 
no impulse has come from them. I cannot see any progress in the NGG. Maybe 
I am setting too high standards. I do not think they can keep up with the pace 
that Europe is setting. Europe has taken on board a new dynamic and this is 
leading to new dimensions which I do not see in the case of the Unions. 




I would welcome a greater presence… There exists a competent group of 
experts, trade unionists and lawyers, that travel from one country to another. 
They meet in really beautiful places and sometimes I am invited too. They are 
often on the road but I never see them in the EWC committees. (Chair 
(German) of the Unilever EWC) 
                
A key issue here, one widely discussed in the literature on trade unions and referred to above 
(Offe and Wiesenthal, 1982; Knudsen et al, 2007; Hyman, 2001), is the continued 
“centrifugal” character of trade union organisations. By their very nature they posses an 
organisational structure which is not only the product of a national environment (Hyman, 
2001), an historical product which emerged in the 19
th
 century, but moreover their main task is 
to support local interests, i.e. the very people that pay their monthly union fees. Interviews 
with trade union officers responsible for Europe confirmed that EWCs don’t belong to 
national officers’ “Kerngeschäft” (main responsibilities) (IGBCE European officer), that the 
EWC only becomes an issue “when there is a fire” (Verdi European officer). Interviews 
revealed that parochialism is not merely a phenomenon amongst German trade unions, though. 
A Belgium delegate on the Ford EWC noted ‘every union is only concerned with its own 
issues’. This represents a general conservatism on the part national trade unions according to a 
Scandinavian delegate on the Logistics Ltd EWC: 
 
I will use a very bad word here because they [union federations] are 
conservative. And everybody is normally afraid of losing their influence, their 
power and so on. And they [union federations] are conservative in that way. 
They do support the European market and things like that, but they say that 
without any real interest… In my opinion it’s quite clear that they are very slow 
and very cautious, conservative even in their thinking about institutions like the 
EWC (Logistics Ltd EWC member) 
 
The widespread reluctance on the part of trade unions to take the proverbial “European step” 
observed within all our five case studies confirms Armingeon’s (1998) critical assessment of 
trade unions’ inability to internationalize. According to Armingeon (1998: 74) this involves 
the problem of “institutional inertia”, a failure to ‘resist pressures to adjust for a long time, 
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even where these are growing stronger’. For example, although the process of company 
centralisation could be observed to different degrees in all five case studies, but especially at 
Kraft Foods, Unilever and Ford, unions remain embedded within the nation state.  
 
A lack of resources and a continued focus on what union officers refer to as the concerns of 
the “national membership”, specifically national collective bargaining, would appear to 
explain the peripheral role played by trade unions within our five EWC case studies. 
Certainly, the rational offered by Armingeon (1998) goes some way to understanding such a 
reluctance. It explains, for example, the situation at –Logistics Ltd, Verdi fearful of the 
internationalisation process underway within the company. However, it does not apply to the 
Ford EWC where unions are far more visible due to reasons discussed above. In the other 
cases, Unilever, Kraft Foods and Sanofi-Aventis a lack of resources might explain the lack of 
union involvement, but equally this might just be an excuse to cover up a lack of political 
commitment for doing nothing. Considering how unions, certainly if one reviews their EWC 
policies, would appear to believe that EWCs could open the floodgates to European company 
level collective bargaining. See from this perspective the lack of involvement is even more 
bewildering. It is this issue, i.e. Micro-corporatism and EWC encroachment that we now turn 
to consider.  
 
7. Encroachment and Micro-corporatism?   
 
At different times we have touched on the issue of “encroachment”, a term used to define the 
possible development of a negotiation modus within the EWC structure and the possible 
usurpation of trade unions on the part of EWCs. How real is this development, though? In 
recent years Marginson et al (1993, 2006) and Kotthoff (2006) have discussed what is now 
widely referred to as the Eurocompany. Here, ‘international companies develop distinct 
European dimensions to their forms of (management) organisation and coordination of 
production and market servicing (Marginson, 2000: 10)’. More to the point such a 
development is seen as a catalyst for European-micro-corporatism, in which ‘EWCs are likely 
to provide a focal point for further developments in European industrial relations, especially 
European collective bargaining (Marginson, 2000: 11).’ Discussing wider developments in 
industrial relations Brewster et al (2007: 51) come to the core issue here when they note that 
micro-corporatism involves a shrinking market for employee representation, i.e. EWCs 
competing with trade unions to represent employees: 
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[A]ll forms of collective representation – whether union based or not – are 
likely to be eroded in favour of more direct, manger centred forms of 
participation. If this is indeed the case it suggests that a shrinking market for 
such services might intensify competition between different representative 
practices. 
  
As the literature pertaining to EWCs indicates, this represents a nightmare scenario for trade 
unions (Lucio and Weston, 2000), one which unions have been aware of ever since the EWC 
Directive was passed in 1994. Of course, trade unions’ concerns were alleviated to a certain 
extent by the fact that the Directive only empowers employees with information and 
consultation rights, a restriction it should not be forgot that the ETUC did not deem necessary 
to address when negotiating the “recasting” of the Directive in 2008. In fact, we would argue 
that trade unions have sort to restrict the influence of EWCs in an attempt to maintain the 
collective bargaining status quo. Huzzrad and Docherty (2005) note, for example, that the so-
called “Network for Union Democracy”,3 categorically prohibits EWCs from touching issues 
relating to pay and conditions. In a similar vein, EIF have used various congresses to pass 
policies designed to steer EWCs away from becoming an active negotiator.  Discussing the 
EWC Directive the EMF (2000b: 6) argued: 
 
[T]he legislator should stipulate where their competency ends (in our view 
where collective bargaining, wage negotiations and discussions about labour 
conditions and similar issues beginning), for these have always been – and 
should remain – the responsibility of trade unions at European level… Within 
such a framework, EWCs would become legally defined information and 
consultation bodies… Our feeling is that the right to negotiate within the 
community-scale companies should remain with European trade union 
organizations. At a later date EWCs could secure negotiation rights, but only 
in connection with specific soft issues, like equal opportunities, vocational 
training and the fight against discrimination. 
  
The likes of the EMF (2000d) are aware of the possibility of EWCs developing a negotiation 
strand to its remit. Even given the restrictions imposed by the Directive and trade unions 
themselves (although in the case of the latter this is highly problematical due to the fact that 
                                                 
3
 The network is described as a loose group of unions on continental Europe.  
 24 
EWCs are not legally dependent of a union mandate) the EMF concedes that the question of 
collective bargaining is not “clear-cut”. This issue has also been taken up in the work of 
Telljohann et al (2009) who studied EWCs’ role in signing European Framework agreements. 
Firstly, they note, how many EWCs are no-longer content with receiving and commenting on 
information. On the contrary, we should not ‘exclude an evolution of the bargaining practices 
of parties towards transnational collective bargaining at the company level on a voluntary 
basis (Telljohann et al, 2009: 20).’ Furthermore, Telljohann et al (2009: 56) suggest that 
framework agreements, specifically those signed pertaining to Europe, is further evidence of a 
trade union and EWC decoupling process:    
 
The differences between IFAs [International Framework Agreements] and 
European-level framework agreements [is that they differ] procedurally in 
terms of the role played by different actors. In this case of European-level 
framework agreements, transnational company level employee representation 
structures (i.e. EWCs) play a much stronger role in initiating, negotiating and 
signing the agreements.   
 
Certainly, some of the case studies presented here confirm many of the developments, fears 
and potential conflicts between EWCs and trade unions outlined above. Although the speed of 
change might have varied all five case studies have either gone or are going through a process 
of centralisation, a process that has seen them evolve into a Eurocompany as outlined by 
Marginson (2000). In particular, Ford, Unilever and Kraft Foods have a strong central 
management structure. Furthermore, let us not forget that Ford was one of the case studies 
that initially inspired Marginson’s work. Referring to the situation at Kraft Foods a member of 
the EWC steering committee: 
 
The importance will increase due to the centralization process occurring in the 
company within Europe. If the unions are unable to focus more on these 
developments a process of decoupling will take place and there will be more 
and more EWCs that will deal directly with management, namely company 
agreements at a European level that break away from the trade union 
movement. That will happen. .  
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In the case of Unilever, for example, the EWC has negotiated a new agreement which 
provides it with not only more rights but also procedures to be adhered to in periods of 
restructuring. A member of the EWC takes up the story:  
 
We devised processes that should be followed in cases of restructuring. In 
particular that it is better to sell a plant rather than to close it, that we need 
employment guarantees for a period of three years in the case of a takeover, 
restructuring and the transfer of production. In the main these demands have 
been respected.          
 
However, as a Logistics Ltd EWC member noted, unions are wary of such developments: ‘I 
think they [unions] are simply afraid of losing the bargaining rights. That is the key point.’ As 
an EMF officer indicates such agreements contradict their guidelines and hence represent the 
potential for conflict: 
 
But the EMF position is clear. We will not recognize [international] framework 
or European framework agreements which have not followed the procedure 
which we have decided on here internally, because we don’t want trade unions 
to be by passed.   
 
Although conflict between EWCs and trade unions over “representative rights” was not 
widespread, due if nothing else to a current lack of interaction between these two levels, 
respondents did reference a few occasions when this had occurred. At Ford, for example, the 
following German EWC respondent explains in some detail how their British colleague, a 
convenor, had had been reprimanded by a union officer for taking decisions that usually fall 
within the realm of trade union responsibility:  
 
The British convener totally understood the German way of leading job 
security negotiations at a company level. This caused major problems with his 
union officer because this was the first time a convener, someone in England 
who has not really too much to say, namely that is always the job of the union 
officer, said to his officer „look here this is a totally different tradition and this 
is really good and it is something we should follow.” But the union was not 
willing to play ball as they thought it was getting involved in the tasks 
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undertaken by the union. This stance though soon disappeared when Peter 
retired. The union officers once again are the key actors.  
 
When questioned about collective bargaining rights the British officer siting on the Ford EWC 
had this to say:  
 
 Do I see a … Ford of Europe EWC as the bargaining instrument for Ford of 
Europe employees? No, I don’t, I don’t. That’s too complex, it’s too 
complicated, there’s different structures… there’s legally binding 
agreements… there’s a whole mish-mash if you like… everybody is different… 
[Y]ou know, ultimately if I’m asked the question: “Is the EWC for that? 
[collective bargaining]” – “No, of course, it is not.” But what it does it allows 
us to exchange information. It allows us to debate with colleagues who are 
predominantly in the same situation as we are in.  
 
Such discrepancy could be observed at Sanofi-Aventis, too. Here the role of the EWC, in 
particular whether the EWC should be empowered with a mandate to negotiate - led to 
conflict between EWC delegates and EMCEF, the European federation. As a French member 
of the select committee outlines, the conflict continues to hinder relations between these two 
representative levels:  
 
We felt really betrayed by EMCEF when it did not support our approach – and 
the national unions did not support us either. The majority does not support 
our approach and as a consequence this had the effect that the bond has 
become a bit looser. I was very angry. Okay in the case EMCEF there will take 
place a meeting. But because of what has happened it will be lot more difficult. 
As far as I am concerned there are some people who I am not really that 
interested in meeting - because I believe they betrayed us even though the EWC 
has the right to negotiate with the company. 
    
In summary, our case studies partly corroborate Marginson’s assertion that a centralisation of 
the managerial-decision-making process is occurring in addition, that such a development 
represents the potential for an emerging European industrial relations system of which the 
EWC is a key edifice. Constituted by employees of the company this European body has 
begun to surpass the legal and the organisational restrictions imposed by legislators and trade 
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unions. EWC delegates, certainly in the case of Kraft Foods, Unilever and Ford, have entered 
into a process of social dialogue with management that is resulting in EWC agreements. 
According to Telljohann et al (2009: 58) such a situation represents a strategic dilemma for 
trade unions, ‘European-level negotiations by EWCs represent, on one hand, a useful strategy 
to handle the consequences of and to counter the increasing transnational economic activities 
of TNCs. On the other hand, trade unions need to ensure that they stay involved in company-
level negotiations at European company-level because if EWCs decide to enter into 
negotiations without involving trade unions, then unions risk being marginalised.’ This raises 
of course the question whether EWC delegates actively desire the marginalisation of trade 
unions. We uncovered no evidence to support such a position. Discussions with management 
and agreements negotiated by the EWC did not deal with issues sacrosanct to unions such as 
pay. Moreover EWC delegates did not appear opposed to unions entering this process. On the 
contrary they would welcome greater involvement should it ever prevail. As shown in 
Kotthoff’s study (2006) as well as in our current research EWC members regretted that unions 
had not played a greater role in EWC affairs: 
  
Ok it is important that the unions offer a certain level of input because the 
representatives from the different countries have a better, and I am not only 
talking about the car industry here, overview about what is happening. What 
the competitors are doing. I think it is important that they are present because 
during the discussions they can offer a wider perspective.  (Ford EWC delegate 
Germany) 
 
For me the unions need to be more aggressive than they are today. (Unilever 
EWC delegate Spain) 
 
I think that union involvement is a positive thing because it helps guide the 
individuals in terms of legislation. They understand better what’s going on… 
So there are an awful lot of things that they learn about… (Unilever EWC 
delegate UK) 
 
As the above quotes suggest, EWC delegates would welcome a greater trade union 
involvement. This is partly out of sympathy for trade union values, and lest we forget many 
respondents were keen to refer to their trade union membership, but more importantly because 
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they envisage trade unions have an important role to play in EWCs, specifically union’s 
knowledge of developments across sectors, expertise in legal issues and the ability to organise 
industrial action.  
   
8. Summary  
 
Having fought for over three decades on behalf of employee rights within the European Union 
(formerly European community), in particular the EWC Directive, our research seen from the 
perspective of EWCs to suggest trade unions continue to struggle in developing a European 
perspective. We uncovered no evidence to corroborate Lecher et al’s (2001) assertion that 
national unions have been forced away from a policy in which Europe, particularly EWCs, is 
a niche issue, to one whereby Europe is integrated into union policy generally. On the 
contrary, EWC delegates and union officers outlined that Europe generally and EWCs 
specifically remain peripheral issues for trade unions. Based on the evidence presented here it 
would be an exaggeration to say that the EWC is characterised as trade union “free zone”, 
they can be known to attend EWC meetings and the European vanguard are keen advocates of 
trade union principles. But equally it would be an overstatement to suggest that they play a 
key role in guiding the inner-workings of this European institution. Alarmingly for trade 
unions, EWCs, certainly in the cases of Unilever and Kraft Foods, appear able to guide 
company policy irrespective of the former’s inability to be more present within this European 
institution. In short, EWCs have become an autonomous employee body which is responding 
to management’s strategy to centralise decision-making-processes, i.e. to shadow the 
emergence of a Eurocompany.  
 
Finally, we uncovered no evidence to support the “the capture and isolation” argument raised 
in the literature. Irrespective of what one union officer called the “Kirchturmpolitik” 
(parochialism) of trade unions, EWC delegates, especially those we have referred to as the so-
called European vanguard, EWC officers and members of the various steering committees - 
have stepped in to fill the void left by trade unions. This represents a silver lining. Faced by 
trade union inertia, certainly observed in the cases of Unilever, Kraft Foods , Sanofi-Aventis 
and partly in the case of Logistics Ltd  (Verdi), our findings suggest that a group of 
committed EWC activists, actors with a clear European outlook, are promoting an agenda 
which can potentially lay the foundations for a European system of industrial relations. This 
emerging developmental path is not only a challenge to management prerogatives, but equally 
to trade unions’  “containment” policies. Seen from this perspective one might be 
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optimistically led to conclude that this represents a potential route for trade union 
Europeanisation from below. After all none of the EWC respondents demonstrated an interest 
in questioning the principles of trade unionism, rather they argued that such principles 
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